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Artistic culture: The Trial by Freedom
Daniil Dondurei
The Official Blueprints and Unofficial Realities of Soviet Artistic
Culture
"The poet in Russia is more than just a poet." This line from Evgeny
Yevtushenko's verse hints at the unique place that artistic culture has
occupied in Russia 's tragic history. From Radishchev and Tolstoy to
Solzhenitsyn and Tarkovsky, writers, painters, film makers -- cultural
producers of every kind -- undertook to explain Russian society to itself.
The common view that depicts Soviet art as subservient to ideology is well
grounded in facts, but it tends to conceal as much as it reveals. Soviet
artists served the state, and thus could not help but being influenced by
the nation's poisonous political climate. But they also thrived in the
pungent native soil, soared high in their struggle against the system,
carved out an inner space where they could experiment with their craft
and turn their humiliation into inspired works of art. Soviet artistic culture
is a paradoxical tangle of forces, impulses, and relations generated by the
nation's spiritual and social currents that defy attempts to dispose of them
in one fell swoop.
Take, for instance, the ideological pressure under which Soviet artists had
to labor for some 70 years. It weighed heavily on artistic creativity, but it
also inspired an unofficial art which flourished on the Soviet Union 's
cultural reservations. The same goes for popular or mass culture. It
shaped a multi-layered mythological consciousness steeped in official
values and beliefs; at the same time, it fulfilled a certain therapeutical and
compensatory function by fostering an ideal of closely-knit human
relations based on love, friendship, and ethical concerns. Film makers
Grigory Aleksandrov and Ivan Pyriev, painters Aleksander Deineka and
Petr Konchalovsky, composers Aram Khachaturian and Isaak Dunaevsky
did sell themselves to the powers, but in the process, they managed not
only to save their lives but also to produce some genuinely innovative art.
Russian Marxists did not create tension between the state and the artist -this tension predated the October Revolution -- but they exacerbated the
situation by insisting that the artist must subordinate his creative impulses
to the noble goal of improving people's lives. Pushing the idea to the
logical extreme, Bolsheviks proclaimed that serving the common good was
the mark of genuine art and that the failure to subordinate one's artistry

to the revolutionary cause could be taken as the proof that one did not
belong to the profession. In 1918, People's Commissar, A. Lunacharsky,
promised that the Soviet power would "mercilessly purge the temple of art
from all those who are out to sell it and poison people's minds." Soviet art
had to be dedicated exclusively to the propaganda and education of "the
widest masses of working people." According to this ideologeme, all
unaffiliated, nonpartisan, and foreign artistic experience was judged to be
suspect, alien, or bourgeois, consequently incompatible with the building
of a new socialist culture and personality. [1]
"Taming of the art," as Yuri Elagin aptly called this process, required that
all cultural institutions be nationalized, governed from one center,
subjected to censorship, and used to promote uniformity among
artists. Agitprop or the Department of Agitation and Propaganda was set
up in 1920 at the Party Central Committee and charged with the task of
"guiding the political education in the RSFSR [the Russian Federation ] in
its entirety." Along side this overarching agency and under its watchful
eyes, flourished other state and public organizations responsible for what
Soviet ideologists liked to call "cultural building." The most important
among these organizations turned out to be "creative unions" that,
beginning in the 30s, moved to enlist in their ranks all writers, painters,
composers, theater artists, film makers, and architects. Creative unions
helped the party monitor the artistic process in the country, and their
leaders did whatever necessary to insure that their rank and file members
follow the doctrine of socialist realism.
The official artistic culture was distinguished by its totality. The heroes
brought to life by Soviet artists had to be universally admired, be this
Furmanov's Chapaev, Gaidar's Timur, or Mikhalkov's Uncle Stepa -- a
noble representative of the ruthless Soviet militia. This does not mean
that the aesthetic doctrine had remained unchanged throughout the
Soviet era. Periodically, new campaigns would be instigated to promote
naturalism, everdayism, academism, documentalism or other artistic fads
deemed to be the order of the day. Somewhere along the lines, Ilya
Erenburg even dared to attack photographic realism that "sells itself as a
reflection of real life." Still, each innovation had to be sanctioned from
above, and it remained in vogue as along as it had the official seal of
approval, which could be revoked at any time.
The keen interest that the party took in Soviet art comes across in lengthy
broadsides published in Pravda, the communist party's official newspaper.
In 1936, a series of articles appeared in this authoritative source, bearing
such eloquent titles as "Chaos Instead of Music," "Falsehood in the Ballet,"

"Cacophony in Architecture," and "About the Defiling Painters." During the
Great Terror systematically carried out by Stalin, artist's aesthetic
convictions were literally a matter of life and death. Every poetic word,
paint brush, or dance step was closely scrutinized to insure that it adhered
to an ideologically sound pattern. Whenever the latest campaign would
break out, be this the struggle against rootless cosmopolites or the
celebration of Soviet multi-ethnic art, artists had to show their
enthusiasm. The emphasis on Soviet classics, the nation's economic
achievements, or the people's victory in World War II were periodically
decreed as the most important artistic themes, which then would become
more or less mandatory for all art practitioners. In the same fashion, the
Communist Party Central Committee or the KGB departments responsible
for art could instigate a national debate about the latest theater premier
or painting exhibit, as was the case with the 1973 premier of "The Master
and Margarita," a play directed by Yuri Liubimov, or with the (in)famous
art exhibit staged in 1975 at the Palace of Achievements of People's
Economy. The public's real interest and opinion did not count in such
carefully orchestrated discussions, which were planned ahead by the party
bosses, who used their power to settle scores with nonconformist
intellectuals and to reward the politically correct ones. The latter learned
to navigate between official values and the shifting political currents of the
day. Even when the audience clearly favored one artistic product over
another, the outcome did not mean much, for honorariums and praise
lavished on the artists had little to do with the proceeds from the show.
The law of supply and demand was inoperative under the monopoly
conditions prevailing in Soviet art. The masses might crave Hollywood
movies, but the authorities refused to order more than ten Hollywood
films a year. About as many films were imported annually from India .
Box-office considerations could never override ideological imperatives. Any
film, record or book was deemed to be a priori "unprofitable," if it did not
conform to correct political standards. While the communist party
tirelessly monitored artistic products for signs of ideological infractions, it
strenuously avoided examining the economic consequences of its harebrained schemes. Artistic production in the Soviet Union had to submit to
the same principles of centralized planning and cope with the same
shortages and distribution gaps as the rest of Soviet economy. Thus, the
State Cinema Committee determined which movie theater would show a
certain film on a given day, with every single movie showing in every
single movie theater following, at least in theory, a centrally approved
plan. This absurd supercentralization persisted for decades and survived
into the early perestroika years.
According to Osip Mandelshtam, the works created by Soviet artists could

be broken down into two categories: "permitted" and "created without
permission." "I want to spit on those writers who write what is permitted,"
wrote Mandelshtam in his "Fourth Prose," "I want to hit them over their
heads with a stick. . . . I would prohibit such writers to marry and have
children." [2] Few authors dared to explore the realm of the unpermitted
subjects and ideas during the Soviet reign. Most dutifully followed the
ideologically proven path. Some remained ambivalent, alternatively trying
to march in lockstep with the masses and strike on their own, to obey the
party line and express their uncensored feelings. Very few shunned the
requisite conformism altogether and dared to challenge the monolithic
value system decreed by the regime.
It goes without saying that artistic life in such a complex modern society
as the Soviet Union could never be fully controlled from one center.
Things had to go awry, as orders were passed along the chain of
command. There were also internal policy divisions within the communist
party itself, which Soviet artists learned to exploit. During the
Khrushchev-inspired debate over Stalin's crimes, for instance, a number
of works was published, including Solzhenitsyn's "Ivan Denisovich," which
would not have had a ghost of a chance at other junctures in Soviet
history. The official blueprint for Soviet artistic culture failed to suppress
the unofficial reality, which remained far more diverse than the tabooladen party guidelines would have it. Various unofficial strands of artistic
life sprang to life after Stain's death and even prosper in the relatively
liberal times unleashed by Nikita Khrushchev. In addition to the quasiofficial ranking system that arranged all Soviet artists according to their
contribution to building a socialist society, there was an unofficial
hierarchy that assigned prestige to artists according to their skills, talents,
and personal courage. An artistic event frowned upon by ideological
watchdogs could be hailed by the nonconformist intelligentsia, the
information about it swiftly spread by the word of mouth. Similarly, a
highly-touted art exhibit by a state-decorated painter could be boycotted
by independent artists.
It would be wrong, therefore, to judge Soviet artistic culture by official
pronouncements, formal reviews, and award ceremonies, which
consistently glossed over the complex realities of artistic life in the Soviet
Union . Hidden behind the "iron curtain" was a complicated process that
absorbed within its bounds bizarre, utterly incongruent elements: the
unlimited power of ancient war lords, feudal corporate gilds, predatory
capitalist practices, and a centralized system of aesthetic education. When
the Communist Party finally yielded its monopoly on power, it left behind a
murky legacy that included along with the ecological and spiritual

Chernobyls the diverse cultural achievements with a continuous appeal to
the cultural elite and mass consumers alike. After all, official Soviet
culture was produced not just by the witless political opportunists but also
by highly talented artists. Hence, mistaken are those progressive liberals
who dismiss Soviet artistic culture in toto and treat its products
exclusively as ideological ciphers devoid of artistic merit.
Soviet Artistic Culture Under Perestroika
The Gorbachev era was marked by the erosion of ideological taboos and
the dismantling of Socialist Realism. Censorship was rapidly losing its grip
on the artistic spirit. The party line that used to separate right from
wrong, the aesthetically meritorious from the aesthetically worthless, was
now open to second-guessing. By the late 80s, most artists discarded
their ingrained habits of self-censorship; some dug out evidence of their
nonconformist past and proudly paraded it before the public.
Spearheading the revolt in the arts, members of the Cinema Union
refused to reelect at their fifth national congress officially approved
candidates for the organization's top offices -- an act of breathtaking
courage by the standards of 1986. Long-humiliated and repressed, the
artistic intelligentsia savored its revenge against the "art critics in civilian
clothes" who did the party's and KGB's bidding among artists in the past.
The earlier-suppressed art works by Soviet and foreign authors were
exhumed and made public for the first time. In 1986, the Stanislavsky
Theater staged Beckett's play, "The Chairs," and in 1987, the Ermolaeva
Theater produced his "Waiting for Godot." In 1988, Novy Mir published
Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. The same year, an immensely popular
counter-cultural film, "Little Vera," was released in Soviet movie theaters.
Next year, the Sovremennik Theater staged a play by Soviet dissident
writer, Vladimir Voinovich. Meanwhile, nonconformist works by Soviet
artists began reaching audiences abroad, some earning top honors at
international competitions. All these novelties made abundantly clear that
Soviet artistic culture was undergoing a major, perhaps revolutionary,
change.
"In my view, Russia is the only country today where there exists artistic
freedom. It is hard to say how long this situation will last. Freedom always
faces challenges. One of its enemies is the market, the other -censorship." [3] This remarkable testimony belongs to Andrey
Konchalovsky, a Soviet film maker, who knew first hand the artistic scene
in both Soviet Russia and the capitalist West. Indeed, perestroika offered
Soviet artists golden opportunities for free self-expression. Political
constraints no longer stifled artistic creativity. At the same time, the

paternalistic socialist state continued to take care of artists' needs,
effectively relieving them from any economic responsibility. Every third
film produced during the heyday of perestroika failed to recoup a tenth of
its production cost. Hundreds of millions of rubles were lost, but since
these were "nobody's rubles" generated by the still socialist economy,
nobody complained. The question of the place that art should occupy in a
postcommunist society did not hit Russian artists until after perestroika
was nearly over. When Eric Weisman, ex-vice chairman of Warner
Brothers, told a Moscow audience during his lecture about American
cinema that "the movie director is worth as much as the proceeds from his
last movie," Russian film makers were visibly upset. Such crass
materialism seemed incompatible with the artists' lofty aspirations.
[4] The Russian artistic intelligentsia always believed that "money could
only ruin art," that the artist "must chose between commercial success
and his talent." In the land of dying socialism, commercial success still
appears to be a random event, the luck of the draw, which might bring
the artist a fortune, but which is in no way indicative of his work's artistic
merit. If anything, success at the box office bodes ill for the development
of a true artist, whose calling is to create timeless spiritual values, not to
please the public.
Still, many artists took notice that the changed political climate might
bring one spectacular financial success. In July of 1988, at a major auction
organized by a Western company, four paintings produced by a practically
unknown artist, Grigory Bruskin, fetched $700,000 -- the biggest personal
profit ever made in the history of Russian art. [5] That Russian artists
could spark interest in the West and have some real market value became
clear from numerous art exhibits, film festivals, and musicians' contests
that showcased Russian art abroad. Whoever had incurred the wrath of
the communist authorities in the past could now expect sympathetic
hearing abroad. The popularity that Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms
enjoyed in the West must have rubbed off on Soviet artists. True or not,
ex-dissident artists were perceived in the West as Gorbachev's soulmates, active carriers of liberal culture who helped bring the end of the
cold war. "Sotsart," an artistic current that mocked socialist values by
hyperextending socialist symbols and images, gained special favor in the
West. The works by its representatives were prominently featured not
only in elite art magazines but also in mass consumption publications,
such as the Reader's Digest. One by one, all barriers to art exports from
Russia fell off.
Just as Soviet art found a niche in Western markets, Russian emigre art
made its way back home. Brodsky, Limonov, Willy Tokarev -- no border

patrol could any longer keep the ex-Soviet artists from regaining mass
audience, entering the local markets in Russia, affecting the fortunes of
publishers and art entrepreneurs. The art production in Russia increasingly
came under the sway of market mechanisms. Indicative in this respect is
the fate of the publishing industry in postcommunist Russia.
It is well known that word -- written or oral -- always had an
extraordinary significance in Russia . As the saying goes, "In Russia, word
is deed." This old saw is literally true: a word could land an individual in
jail or deliver a person from bondage. Having a strict control over words
uttered and printed had been a high priority for Russia 's rulers,
communist and noncommunist. As soon as the communist party began to
lose its monopoly on power, Russia saw an explosion of free speech. The
floodgates were flung open in 1989 when party apparatchiks made a lastditch effort to stem the rise of glasnost by limiting circulation of the most
popular publications. This clumsy attempt failed miserably. Thousands of
new magazines and periodicals hit the newsstands, catering to the public's
insatiable appetite for free information. At the same time, the publishing
industry experienced an unprecedented boom. Artistic books, astrological
treatises, sex manuals, self-help guides -- whatever the Soviet reader
wanted to know about anything and everything was now printed and
made available in regular book stores or make-shift stands set up by
private book vendors.
Just as the centuries-old civilization of unfreedom of speech has expired,
however, "the most reading nation on earth" turned a deaf ear to the free
word. Within a few years of total glasnost, the public lost its interest in
reading literature and listening to speeches. Thick literary journals that
once boasted circulation in the millions now print less than 5% percent of
copies they used to circulate during the height of perestroika. Once
immensely popular newspapers could not sell enough copies to support
themselves and had to beg for government subsidies to stay in business.
Book prices have skyrocketed, making the most sought-after volumes
unaffordable for the average buyer. Even when prices are within reach,
consumers often chose to spend their money elsewhere. Ex-Soviet citizens
have grown tired with the orgy of glasnost. Kliamkin, Shmelev, Popov,
and dozens of other prominent opinion makers who once captivated the
entire nation with their fiery oratory and inspired essays have all but
disappeared from the political center stage. The establishments that made
headway during perestroika are being revamped under pressure from the
market. Well established bookstores are forced to sublet part of their
space to other businesses. In the Fall of 1992, the passerby could spot
brand-new Cadillacs, Pontiacs , and Shevrolets prominently displayed

among the book shelves waiting to be taken out from the well-known
bookstore nestled on the first floor of the newspaper Trud. The store
administrators had to curtail their declining business to make room for the
glamour business of the future. In a striking metaphor, shiny cars
symbolizing capitalism assumed the honorary place inside the building,
while the books epitomizing Russia 's precapitalist past were ready to be
thrown out onto the streets.
Similar metamorphoses marked the transition to postcommunist realities
in other cultural domains. The first Russian film market dates back to
1988, when movie distributors wrestled the right to buy films with an eye
to their profit potential rather than ideological purity. This revolt spelled
the end of the old communist bondage system that mandated which
pictures were to be filmed, which shown to the public, and which
indefinitely shelved. Foreign products inundated the Russian TV and movie
theaters, their share jumping from thirty five percent in 1986 to eighty
five percent in 1989. [6] About the same time, pirated video tapes poured
into the country. The growth in cultural import was accompanied by the
explosion of domestic artistic production. Hundreds of new art galleries,
movie studios, theater groups, and musical collectives sprouted in urban
centers. Giant companies, like Roskontsert and Mosfilm, managed to rid
themselves of state control and made tentative moves toward financial
independence.
Given this explosion of artistic activity, one would expect public interest in
art to soar as well. But as with the publishing industry, the reality turned
out to be less palatable. As soon as creative endeavor was freed from all
ideological fetters, Russian artists confronted a formidable challenge: the
sharp decline of public interest in art. In 1986, the cinema industry lost
money. Movie theater attendance dropped from nearly two billion tickets
sold in 1986 to 950 million in 1988. Concert halls and theater houses
could not attract enough people to fill one third of the seats. [7] Ironically,
interest in cultural events evaporated as soon as every Russian (and not
just the well-connected members of the cultural elite) were allowed to
watch once-forbidden movies of Pasolini and listen to the much-vilified
music of Schonberg. Even the pornographic films that flooded the Russian
market during the late 80s failed to arrest the steep decline in the nation's
cultural consumption. The chronic shortages of cultural goods endemic to
socialist society finally came to an end, and along with it, it seems,
vanished the Russian public's yen for art.
This does not mean, of course, that Russians have no more interest in
cultural and artistic products. What happened was that artistic

consumption shifted from the public arena to private homes, which by the
end of the 80s became the locus of cultural life in the country. According
to the sociological data gathered in this period, Russian citizens spent 5 to
6 times more time and 8 to 10 times more money on home entertainment
and private cultural consumption than on attendance in theaters,
concerts, art exhibits, and other public cultural outlets. Something
strange, also, happened to the quality of cultural consumption. [8] The
Russian intelligentsia in particular used to pride itself on its highly
selective approach to what its members read or viewed; new findings
indicated that intellectuals and nonintellectuals alike were watching TV
programs across the board, as though fearing that life itself would grind to
a halt if the tube went blind. Twenty-seven percent of viewers reported
that their TV sets were turned on even when nobody was watching. "I
don't like what I see, but I enjoy watching it anyhow," wrote an avid TV
viewer in his letter to the editor. Another one angrily denounced a TV
station because "I had to stay up until midnight to watch the garbage you
put on the screen, as if I didn't have anything better to do."
Changing public attitudes took their toll on artists. Some prominent film
directors (Gleb Panfilov, Elen Klimov, Aleksei German, Andrei Smirnov)
stopped making movies. Well-known stage directors (Anatoly Vasiliev, Lev
Dodin, Kama Ginkas) do more work abroad than at home. The same is
true about Russia 's leading musicians (Vladimir Spivakov, Yuri Kitaenko,
Alfred Schnitke) and painters (Ilya Kabakov, Leonid Purygin, Igor
Ganikovsky). Still others went the commercial route, consciously catering
to mass market tastes, however distasteful the final product. Emigration,
the bulk of which was comprised by the intelligentsia, reached 200,000
people by the end of the 80s.
The Art, the Artist, and the Quasi-Market
Let us now examine more closely the muddled relationship between art
and market in the post-Soviet era, as exemplified by the Russian film
industry. From 1988 on, the Russian artistic intelligentsia, including film
makers, had most of their dreams come true. There were virtually no
limits to what intellectuals could say about their society, government, and
political system. Virtually all sexual taboos were abandoned. The state
underwrote artistic work with little or no regard for its financial viability,
which gave artists the incentive to take up ambitious projects. The
Russian cinema industry worked overtime. Producers, screen writers,
actors, stage hands -- everybody had as much work as one could handle.
Financiers aggressively invested in risky movie projects, seemingly
without concern for economic realities. [9] Artists did not stand to make

much money from their undertakings, but they did not have to worry
about starving either, even though the ultimate product might be a
financial flop. The socialist system continued to subsidize creative activity,
never mind that the artists lampooned socialism and its byproducts. There
were still nomenklatura bureaucrats with close ties to the party who had
to okey the project, but sensing the changing of the guards, they did not
miss a chance to show their benevolent support for perestroika art.
This situation, which lasted for about three years, produced disastrous
results. Since the path-breaking picture "Little Vera," only one homegrown movie made the top-twenty list of the country's most popular films.
No amount of sex and violence inundating the screen could change the
general trend: movie-theater attendance dropped four-fold between 1988
and 1992. And even when the Russian economy reached the breaking
point and made it impossible to continue generous state subsidies of art,
movies continued to be made in the face of this economically absurd
situation.
One reason why the movie industry did not go bankrupt under these
trying circumstances was the shadow economy that targeted the movie
business for its money-laundrying schemes. There is a lot that Russian
artists could learn from Russian entrepreneurs when it comes to
imagination and creativity. [10] Say, there is a film produced by a
company for two million rubles (prices are still in line with the Gorbachev
era inflation rates). It is purchased by a phantom company which has no
relationship to the movie industry whatsoever. The studio where the film
was shot had all of its expenses reimbursed, plus an arbitrary established
profit of some million and a half rubles was paid to the producers by the
shady company that now owns the movie. The company that purchased
distribution rights doctors the documents that attest to the fabulous
proceeds of ten million rubles from movie runs in the nation's movie
theaters. From that point on, illegal money made from unrelated shady
deals are legitimized. You can bet that the principals in this game were
paid off with hefty bribes that made them rich by Russian standards.
Meanwhile, the film in question has not been shown to the public once.
Another scheme would have the producer get the money from a bank to
pay for equipment, studio space, and actors' fees, spend a whole lot less
for actual shooting, and in the end, present the resultant film as an
experimental product of such extraordinary aesthetic quality that it could
not possibly be understood by the movie-going public. Nobody ever sees
the film, the investors are bought out (remember, money is nobody's!),
and the auditors are still such a rarity that there is no point worrying

about them. In the end, the lost money is written off as a bad investment
by the state.
Or else, the studio director could strike a deal with a foreign company that
wants to use local facilities, show a fictitious price tag in the official
documents, and then split the difference with the foreign partners. The
studio director's personal profit could be deposited in a bank account
abroad. All this in spite of the fact that the studio facilities are not
privately owned, that they still belong to the state, or which is the same
thing, they are collectively owned by the Russian people. [11] Add to this
a chance to speculate on the changing conversion rates when you do
transactions in both hard currency and soft (in Russia they are called
"wooden") rubles, and you can see that the movie business had a lot of
fresh opportunities in the post-Soviet period.
We should keep in mind, however, that local cinema had something to
gain from all this wheeling and dealing. Hollywood paid dollars to Mosfilm,
the preeminent Russian movie company, for Andrey Konchalovsky's
picture "The Inner Circle," and the proceeds more than made up for the
losses that Mosfilm incurred by producing two dozen Russian films. Similar
stories come from Lenfilm and other leading movie companies that have
their own production base and offer foreign companies their facilities. In
those heady years, studio administrators did not look too closely at the
projects undertaken by local directors, as long as the latter showed an
overall profit. As to Russian film makers, they never cared that much
about box office success. High brow pictures, the ones that win prizes at
the international movie festivals, rarely attract much attention from the
general public, anyhow. As long as the artists are allowed to exercise their
artistic freedom, they are more than willing to shoot pictures for each
others.
Thanks to this inane political economy of artistic production, films were
shot that could not be sold, or sold without being copied, or copied
without being distributed to theaters. "The new Russians," those
entrepreneurs who sponsored many films in the perestroika and
postperestroika years, did not care much about quality. The cult of
hopelessness, also known as chernukha, permeated the movies of this
period. Under the pretense of being truthful to reality, financial mentors
encouraged artists to use one color, one emotional tonality, one cruel
method to elicit the viewer's response.
Even after the Soviet Union collapsed, its economy continued to churn out
products that were not meant for consumption, that were not designed to

make profit, that were produced for some mysterious purposes having
nothing to do with art. For all the talk about profit, marketing, costaccounting, and so on, Russia still has no market in place. At best we can
talk about a quasi-market that imitates its external forms. This is not to
deny that revolutionary changes have taken place in the last few years in
financing, production, and distribution of art in Russia . But the central for
market economy relationship between the producer and the consumer
remains profoundly distorted. The Russian market is still largely immune
from the law of supply and demand. Nor is there any credible system of
accounting that would allow a bona fide investor or economist to make an
informed judgment about the industry conditions. There is no national
statistical agency that can track the data and report on federal and local
trends. You cannot be sure how many studios are open for business at
any given point, how many viewers saw a particular picture, what was the
production cost, and so on. All this is a commercial secret. Credible
information is a luxury in a country that, defying Marx, is moving from
mature socialism via eternal feudalism toward primitive capitalism. Or
could it be that reliable information is a barrier to relentless wheeling and
dealing? Here comes to mind the words of the Marquise de Custine, the
19th century Frenchman, who travelled to Russia and observed her
inimitable mores: "In theory, everything seems so overregulated that one
can hardly live under this regime. But in practice, exceptions abound, so
much so that the resultant chaos and contradictions make you wonder
how on earth one could govern the country under these circumstances."
[12]
Russian artists are struggling to shake loose their old shackles and adjust
to the new economic conditions, but in the process they discover that the
old artistic culture -- cliche-ridden, politically-stifling, full of envy and
petty rivalries -- was not without its graces. For all its absurdities, it bred
a sense of belonging and solidarity that comes from being a member of an
exclusive guild. Like a centaur, Soviet artistic culture spliced together and
made possible the coexistence of diverse interests and groups. It fed a
mythology that was familiar to all, that united under one umbrella all
those exposed to the same principles, even though some of these
principles were experienced by as hated official stereotypes. At least there
was a feeling of collective injustice, of shared fate, of a common dead end
where any artist could be hounded by ideological watchdogs. And now this
cozy feeling of negative and positive togetherness is gone, artistic space is
being totally revamped, and those who inhabit it find themselves
competing for the same resources, divided by the market forces more
than they ever were by ideological differences. The aesthetics of socialist
surrealism has fallen by the wayside; the artist is thrown to his own

devices; at last, he is free. But the creative boom promised by vulgar
sociology has failed to materialize. "I am not sure why," confides Aleksei
German, "but we made our best movies when stagnation reigned supreme
and everything was prohibited." [13]
Russia as an Artistic Colony of the West
Now that we have examined the shady transactions between the quasimarket and Russian artistic culture, we can turn to the relationship
between the state, the artist, and the local and international markets.
Specifically, we shall try to understand the impact of the international art
market on Russian art and the policies through which the Russian state is
trying to regulate artistic activity.
The fine arts have always been among the most conservative domains of
Russian artistic culture. It is all the more astounding how quickly the
practitioners in this field have adjusted themselves to postsocialist
realities. Within a few years, Soviet painters and craftsmen were attending
international art auctions, forming joint ventures with Western customers,
selling their ware for hard currency, and opening bank accounts abroad.
The explanation is rather simple: painting is a labor-intensive art that
does not require sophisticated technology and equipment, or for that
matter, mass audience. In the old Soviet Union , it was practiced by
individuals who might have quarrelled with the socialist state, but who
managed to carve out a niche for themselves and, in relative obscurity,
perfected their skills and developed innovative ideas. Painters, animation
artists, craftsmen, and other fine art practitioners did not have to do as
much catching-up with the West as artists in some other fields. When
liberal reforms rolled in, they were ready to come out of the closet fully
equipped for the new deal. However, the state saw the field's considerable
potential as a source of hard currency and it geared its tax policy
accordingly. More than half of the profits made by the artists have to be
returned to the state in the form of taxes. If a transaction between the
Russian artist and the Western customer involves hard currency, the state
prefers to keep the dollars, Deutsche marks, franks and pay the artist the
after-tax portion of his profit in rubles. But the economic strength of the
ruble does not compare with that of freely convertible currencies. Nor are
Russian art collectors in a position to pay top-notch prices for national art
(an art work that could be sold abroad for thousands of dollars would not
fetch a fraction of this amount at home). As a result, the artist is placed in
a situation where he is either going to cheat a state that tries to rob him
and his dealer or to resettle in the West. Russian artists keep in foreign
banks anywhere between 50 to 60 million dollars, according to some

conservative estimates. All the participants in this charade -- dealers,
gallery administrators, collectors, and of course artists -- are convinced
that they are being cheated, that somebody is out to deprive them of their
fair share of profit. The pressure is mounting for all those involved in fine
arts to make a killing, evade the taxes, and then bid goodby to this
monstrous, inefficient, corrupt system.
Our very best artists, both in fine and performing arts, leave the country
in droves in hope of escaping the clutches of the sputtering economy.
Painters, craftsmen, composers, musicians -- the whole orchestras and
ballet schools -- are bidding goodby to their homeland and settling in the
West. The best Russian composers are now permanently residing in
Germany . Even more ominously, the second string musicians, dancers,
singers, philologists, and architects are straining to land a contract abroad
as teachers, coaches, chorus line performers -- whatever could get them
out of the sinking country. Most of them have no wish to leave their
country permanently, but they believe they have to bide their time abroad
until things back home settle enough to afford them a half-decent living.
A related problem is the tendency to gear all artistic output to export
needs. Consciously and unconsciously, Russian artists today strive to
adjust their priorities and criteria to Western standards. They are trying
hard to please potential customers aborad, and along the line neglect their
own creative impulses. The dictate of the Western markets could be no
less stifling than the standards laid out by Suslov's Politburo. Whether the
artist follows Socialist Realism or places himself in the service of his new
employer, he has to do somebody else's bidding. For some Russian artists,
it was easier to submit to the hated ideological strictures of the past when
there seemed to be no other choice than to subordinate one's artistic
impulses to free market demands.
If Russia ever was an artistic superpower, it does not seem to be one any
longer. There is an uneasy feeling in the air that the country has turned
into an artistic colony of the West. It is reinforced by scores of art dealers
and entrepreneurs rummaging Moscow for artistic bargains, feeling like
Victorian Englishmen in Africa or India . Nonetheless, superpower habits
and pretenses are dying hard, even in the face of mounting evidence that
the nation's standards of living are on par with, if not Lesosto than
certainly Thailand . Meanwhile, unofficial art, this fountain spring of
creativity in the past, has virtually disappeared. [14] The spiritual
opposition that fed this uncensored artistic endeavor has been sapped. It
was easier for the artist to assume a defiant stance when Zhdanov ,
Suslov, and Ligachev wagged their fingers at artists and threatened to put

them in jail. [15] With the doublethink and the multi-layered aesthetic
sensibilities it engendered becoming the thing of the past -- the artistic
intelligentsia has little to nourish its nonconformist impulses.
The New Aesthetics and Mass Culture
Official Soviet ideology prided itself on creating a state with "mass
aesthetic literacy," "the highest prestige of art," and "genuinely free
artistic activity." None of these cliches withstood the test of time. We can
size up the situation by taking a closer look at current TV programming
and examining the manner in which mass media shapes popular culture.
If you watch Russian TV today for any length of time, you are likely to
conclude that the Russian viewer must know English to watch the news,
appreciate a movie, or understand advertisement. A synchronized Russian
translation could be provided, depending on the program and its sponsors'
agenda. Nothing new here: English may well become a universal language
for the global media-market civilization of the future, but the pace of
change is staggering.
Take the children's program "Rock-lesson" that first aired in 1992. The
program hosts are a sixteen year old girl, symbolically named "Barbie"
after an internationally acclaimed doll, and a young boy Vania, apparently
born after the death of Leonid Brezhnev. Vania asks his counterpart all
sorts of questions that might interest members of his generation, like how
to dance rap and hip-hop, how to dress up in order to resemble the dance
machine M. C. Hammer, what is love and how to make out. The national
children's audience, which includes kids from provincial towns like Syzran '
and Vologda , are instructed how to look like Americans and act like the
average European. One might think that Russian children have already
emigrated and cannot waste a day without learning the hippest dance
step, tuning in on the top-ten show, or finding out the latest development
in the sensational rape trial of the American heavy-weight boxer, Mike
Tyson. The pirated Hollywood movies and the Hollywood-style
programming that jam Russian TV do far better job at changing the
country's centuries-old mind-set than all of Yeltsin decrees taken together.
We can judge this from a survey conducted in 1991 among six year old
Moscovites. When researchers asked Moscow kindergarten graduates,
"Who do you love the most?", the answer was: mother, father, Chip and
Dale, captain Power, and only then . . . grandma.
Do not rush to conclude, however, that American values dominate Russian
mass culture. Russians may be dreaming about a trip to Disneyland and a

taste of burger at Mcdonalds, but when it comes to loftier matters, they
crave the Mexican soap opera "The Rich One's Are Crying, Too." Very few
viewers missed entirely this sensational series that Russian TV
programmers aired a few years ago. It broke all the rating records, easily
outstripping in popularity American blockbusters and tying the nation to
their screens for months in a row. I do not know if guns fell silent in
Nagorno-Karabakh where Armenians and Azeris were fighting, but it is a
fact that viewers in Moldova and Lithuania thwarted their governments'
decision to boycott Moscow TV because they could not bear the thought of
missing the ending of this melodrama. [16] Veronica Castro, the Mexican
actress who played the soap opera's main character, emerged as one of
the country's most popular personalities in the 1992 polls, placing right
behind the country's president, head of government, and vice-president.
There are several reasons why this run of the mill soap opera had such a
hypnotic effect on the audience in the former Soviet Union . Perhaps the
most compelling one is the full rehabilitation of the lowly -- mass -culture in postindustrial societies, where it invariably supplants folklore as
the archetypical mode of construction of social reality. Among the main
feature distinguishing mass culture are nonambiguity of moral judgments,
consistency of values, accepted wisdom of common sense, inescapability
of suffering, and abiding optimism. Over sixty percent of TV viewers in the
former Soviet Union who saw this soap opera (twice as many as any other
TV program, including the news) gratefully clung to the helping hand
extended to them by the Mexican producer. Disoriented, neglected, and
scorned, the millions of Russian speaking viewers found in this
unpretentious TV series the certainty they missed in their everyday life.
The program allayed their fears before the menacing English-speaking
civilization that threatens their life experience with the words like
"voucher," "digest," broker," "impeachment," and "rating." It relieved
their inferiority complex before high modernist culture and strengthened
their heart in the face of an uncertain future. After watching this soap
opera, many ex-Soviets could summon enough courage to say no to
violence and sex that invaded their screens, to resist aggressive
advertising and ruthless politicians. The Russians took close to heart Latin
American culture because it appeared to them devoid of ethnic, economic,
and generational differences. They felt more attuned to the problems
facing the Salvators' family with its colorful array of dons and seignoritas
than with their own reality shoved down their throats by the familiar
political and artistic personages competing with each other for the dubious
honor of painting the most dire scenario for the future. The simple folk
who survived the Soviet regime know the difference between fiction and
reality, yet they prefer to trust fiction which tells them that evil will be

punished and loyalty rewarded, that in spite of its endless confusions and
challenges -- life is really simple, that all people could be divided into two
classes: angels and demons, and that the only problem is how to tell them
apart.
The Trial by Freedom: Prospects for Russian Artistic Market
Soviet artistic culture has been often pictured in black and white colors:
official art approved by the communist party, on the one hand, and
unofficial, experimental art that flourished on the fringes of society, on the
other. Looked at from the vantage point of the present, the reality seems
more complex than common judgment allows. Compared to the marketimposed uniformities, the art produced during the Soviet era now appears
to be complex, nuanced, pluralistic, daring, and often inspired. It may be
premature to talk about the decline of artistic culture in today's Russia ,
but we can attest to the precipitously declining public demand for art.
When a book-salesman can earn twenty times as much as a writer and
professor's salary is typically lower than his student's income, the public
turns away from art and looks for other venues of personal growth.
The drop in prestige of art is inevitable in a country where art served as a
political club, research laboratory, psychological therapy, and performed
numerous other functions not central to its mission. With the public
redeploying its interests and resources toward material comfort, a slogan
once issued by a 19th century aesthetic realist, D. I. Pisarev -- "boots are
higher than Pushkin" -- seems to have come true. The status of art as an
aesthetic force binding together the nation has been compromised, and
along with it, the need to cultivate aesthetic sensibilities. Art has lost its
power to confer prestige on its practitioners and connoisseurs. Your place
in the group hierarchy depends on your ability to tell the difference
between a Toyota and Nissan more than on your ability to distinguish
between Sartre and Camus, it has more to do with your awareness of the
Baskin Robbins ice cream flavors than with the fact that you have
attended an exhibit featuring paintings from the Prado Museum. The "new
Russians," resembling yuppies in their fondness for expensive suits and
glitzy cars, are yearning not for tickets to attend a Tarkovsky's
retrospective but for a vacation in the Bahamas . They cannot stand the
intelligentsia's interminable kitchen debates about the country's future
that used to absorb the country's cultural elite. Now, consumer culture
supplants artistic culture, imported culture -- domestic culture, mass
culture -- elite culture. The Russian artist can no longer hope to earn a
living by selling his art to local consumers. To survive, he has to appeal to
the state, shady businessmen, and foreign buyers. What would Russian

film makers do without a money-laundrying sponsor, given the galloping
inflation, dwindling ticket sales, the flood of pirated videos, and a virtual
guarantee that any locally produced movie could not earn more than a
quarter of its cost? [17]If current trends continue, Russian film makers
will lose the last outlet for their artistic production -- national TV.
We are witnessing the great historical experiment: the titanic struggle
between Russian economic theory and practice, on the one hand, and a
Western-style market economy, on the other. [18] If capitalist market
laws prevail in Russia , we should see the Russian film industry coming to
the brink of extinction. Already most of some five hundred movie studios
in the country are without business. The result will be massive
unemployment among artists, perhaps mitigated by the arrival of
advertising agencies and other start-up businesses that could use artistic
skills. [19] If things are allowed to drag on, Russia 's voodoo economics
will avoid forging the bond between art industry and mass consumers.
As ever, our best minds are tirelessly pondering the question how to build
the market in postcommunist Russia , how to make the state serve its
citizens instead of sacrificing individual interests to the state. Some point
to precedents from the prerevolutinary era, when Russia made
considerable strides toward the market under the able stewardship of
Witte and Stolypin. As Gogol once lamented, Russia 's privileged fate is to
skip the present and dream its way into the future. The fantastic blend of
the old and new structures in today's Russia , of the legal and black
markets, reflects the inertia of a centuries-old cultural tradition that
stubbornly resists radical reforms. [20] But there is always hope. Unlike
gas and oil, the nation's supply of renewable artistic talent is vast.
Perhaps one day, the country will manage to put it to good use. Perhaps,
it will even find a place within its own border for both mass and high
culture, consumer and elite art. Meanwhile, the question persists when, if
not whether, the country would develop a viable economics and at what
price. As L. Nevler, student of culture, put it: "I know that the market has
many advantages, but we should remember the inhospitable native soil
where it is struggling to sink roots, our fabled capacity to make a mockery
of the most wonderful ideas that we seek to adopt. How many times in the
past did we feel foolish and idiotic after sowing one thing and harvesting
something altogether different?" [21]
The fate of art in Russia , both socialist and nonsocialist, tells us
something important about society as a whole. We just need to figure out
what could it possibly be?
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